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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a large sample of individual responses to six lottery questions. We
derive a simultaneous estimate of risk aversion and the time preference discount rate per
individual. This can be done because the consumption of a large prize is smoothed over a
larger time period. It is found that both parameters strongly vary over individuals, while they
are moderately negatively correlated. Furthermore we explain the estimated relative risk
aversion and time preference by income, age, gender, entrepreneurship and an obesity index.
Very significant effects are found. If we explain relative risk aversion in a simple model
where time discounting is ignored, we find completely different estimates for this parameter.
We conclude that in the case of lotteries with big prizes a simultaneous estimate of risk
aversion and time preference is needed in order to avoid misspecification. 
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Choice behavior of economic agents is hampered in practice by two complicating phenomena. 
First, the outcome of our decisions may be a random variable. Examples are investment under 
uncertainty, buying insurance policies or shares and participation in lotteries. Second, many 
decisions have consequences for the future. They do not only affect present utility but future 
utility as well. Examples are again investments, the purchase of durable goods and savings. 
 
For both problems there are standard solutions. Decisions under uncertainty are described by the 
Von Neumann - Morgenstern (VNM) model, which defines the utility to be maximized as the 
expectation of the utilities of the random alternatives. The VNM - model is not beyond 
discussion. We refer to Allais (1953), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) and Wakker and Tversky (1993) for critique and alternatives. Within the VNM - 
approach an important ingredient is the specification of the utility function. The most popular 
one-parameter specification is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function where the 
(cardinal) utility function is characterized by the risk aversion parameter γ . Empirical estimates 
for   vary from 1.5 to 8. Most studies of risk aversion look either at gambles (see e.g. Jullien 
and Salanié (2000), Beetsma and Schotman (2001), Hartog, Ferrer- i - Carbonell and Jonker 
(2002)) or at decisions on the choice of risky assets in portfolios or the choice of insurance 
policies (Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), Kapteyn and Teppa (2002), Donkers, Melenberg and Van 
Soest (2001)). Subjective measures of risk aversion obtained through hypothetical questions have 
also been used to explain choice under uncertainty (see, for example, Barsky, Juster, Kimball and 
Shapiro (1997), Kapteyn and Teppa (2002)). 
γ
A very similar model, the discounted utility model, describes the problem of decisions over 
time where utilities at different moments of time are weighted by a subjective time discount rate 
. This model is also not beyond discussion as is clear from the critique of Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992). The not so many empirical estimates of the parameter   vary a great deal. They 
are mostly derived from consumption - smoothing models (Trostel and Taylor (2001)), 
experimental choice situations (e.g. Read (2001), Benzion, Rapoport, Yagil(1989)) or 
hypothetical questions (see e.g. Lazaro, Barberan and Rubio (2001)). 
ρ
ρ
It is rather evident that many of these problems are in fact ridden by the two complications 
simultaneously. Decisions reach over time and they are risky. Obstfeld (1994) observes that 
  2‘unless risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability are carefully separated, attempts to 
measure the welfare cost of changes in consumption risk can yield misleading conclusions about 
the role of risk aversion. Under expected-utility preferences, which make no such separation, an 
increase in risk aversion simultaneously alters the effective discount factor ….’. 
It follows that such situations have to be described by a utility function  , 
where we sum over the random states s and the moments of time t. The subject of this paper will 
be the joint estimation of the time discount rate and relative risk aversion. According to our 
knowledge there are only a few and scattered publications with respect to this simultaneous 
approach and a small number of estimates. We refer to Abdulkadri and Langemeier (2000) who 
try to estimate both coefficients simultaneously using farm consumption data obtaining estimates 
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between 0.158 and 0.351 and estimates of relative 
risk aversion between 2.849 and 6.329. Another example is the joint estimation of relative risk 
aversion, the discount rate and the elasticity of substitution by Issler and Piqueira (2000) using 
macro-consumption data of the Brazilian economy. Their results with respect to the discount rate 
seem robust at between .8 and .9 per year whereas their estimates of relative risk aversion are 
very sensitive to the model specification used. 
,,
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There are various empirical frameworks where we actually attempt to estimate such models. 
The first source is observation of real life situations, where we observe households, firms or 
traders on the stock exchange. It is well known that this is a notorious problem in practice. The 
quality of the data is frequently weak and the number of observations not very large and/or 
selective. Another source of data is experiments in experimental economics laboratories. The 
evident advantage of the experimental setting is that we can formulate the decision problem and 
vary it at will, while observing the respondent's reactions to changes. In practice such 
experiments have a lottery structure. A drawback with this way of data collection is the artificial 
environment, the relatively small numbers of observations that can be realized, and the fact that 
in practice the respondents are mostly students who cannot be seen as representative for the 
population at large. Finally, as the prizes are mostly paid out to make things more realistic, 
necessarily the prizes will be small money. However, it may well be possible that behavior 
differs with the seriousness of the price. Especially for small amounts the tendency will be to 
consume the price within a few days without any saving. For large prizes this will be different 
  3and we may assume an effect of time discounting. However, the problem with real experiments 
is that large prizes are too costly to pay out in practice.  
Hence, we see that all the situations described have their drawbacks. Either there are a small 
number of observations, or the empirical description and observation is problematic or there are 
problems with the relevance of the observations for the test persons are in laboratory settings. 
Sometimes, a variety of the objections holds at the same time. This is not intended as a critique, 
since the ideal situation is difficult to find in reality. However, it points to the fact that we have 
to compromise. A final point that may be surmised is whether it is reasonable to assume that the 
risk aversion used in small lotteries with a slight chance on a prize should have to be the same as 
the risk aversion on which we base major investment decisions. Is there a possibility that the 
underlying behavioral model used is context-dependent? 
 
Necessarily the present paper also starts from a compromise. In this paper we use a large 
anonymous survey in which we ask for the bidding price for six different lotteries (cf. Hartog, 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Jonkers (2001) who use the same data source). Given the fact that we have 
six lotteries, it is possible to simultaneously identify an approximate value for the respondent’s 
relative risk aversion   and the respondent’s subjective discount rate . It turns out that there is 
a correlation of about -0.35 between the two values. Given the fact that our sample consists of 
about 8,000 respondents, we can explain the variations in   and   by some individual 
characteristics like income, age, education, gender, intensity of religious participation, 
entrepreneurship, the individual's Quetelet index and other variables. Most effects are very 
significant and plausible. In terms of variance explained the results are poor. It is evident that this 
data collection mode has his shortcomings as well. We may be sure that most respondents did 
not spend much time in answering the questions, as these were fictitious lotteries without any 
real possible rewards or losses. Nevertheless, we can assume that nearly all respondents have 
been co-operative and that they have not reported nonsensical answers. We did, however, drop 
those respondents who were responding in a strange or irrational way, for instance, when they 




  4The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the data, followed by the 
description of the behavioral model in Section 3. In Section 4 we present and analyze the survey 
results. In Section 5 we conclude with a discussion and an evaluation. 
 
2. The data. 
Our data have been collected in a somewhat unorthodox way. In the Netherlands nearly all daily 
journals are distributed on a subscription basis, where readers have a strong link with their 
journal. There are about six national dailies, which are focusing on national and international 
news; they are identifiable as belonging to the right or the left of the political spectrum. Next to 
those six journals there are a score of regional dailies, which are widely distributed on a 
subscription basis among the households of a specific city or region. A sizeable minority is 
subscriber to a ‘national’ and a ‘regional’ at the same time. The ‘regionals’ focus on local news, 
but they cover national and international news as well. With a view on the cost of an 
international network of correspondents the regional dailies share the international network. 
Therefore they are member of a combination, the Joint Press Services (GPD) at The Hague. 
Once in about four years since 1983 the GPD- dailies print an extensive questionnaire
1 in their 
Saturday issue, consisting of about thousand items. The readership, consisting of over 2 million 
households, is invited to fill out the anonymous questionnaire, and to return it to their journal by 
mail, unstamped. We notice that this procedure differs in several aspects from usual procedures. 
First, the questionnaire is rather long, second no person gets a reminder when it is not returned, 
and third the respondent does not get a gift for responding. In short, the predictions for response 
must be bleak. Indeed the response is about 2%, which is comparable to the response on direct 
mail campaigns. Although this percentage seems low, the absolute number of respondents is 
huge. There are about 40,000 persons who return the questionnaire within a fortnight with 
genuine enthusiasm. The results are presented and analyzed in the regional journals. Mostly the 
survey is done shortly before general elections, such that the results can help citizens in making 
their voting decision and can inform the politicians about the opinions among the population. 
Of course we may doubt whether such a survey is representative for the Dutch population. 
The first obvious restriction is that respondents have to be subscribed to a journal. It was found 
                                                           
1 The GPD-surveys have been conducted in 1983, 1984, 1991, 1998 and 2001. They have been designed and 
analyzed by B.M.S. van Praag and varying co -authors, starting with the late Aldi Hagenaars. 
  5that the readership is a good reflection of the Dutch population minus the ethnic minorities who 
are not subscribing and in many cases do not speak and write Dutch sufficiently and minus the 
truly poor who do not read a regularly journal. The sample of respondents are somewhat older 
and more educated than the average, but after the usual re-weighting the sample may be 
considered as representative for the Dutch population minus the two segments mentioned. The 
GPD-samples have been used for government-commissioned studies and have been the basis for 
several scientific research projects. For the study in this paper we do not need and, consequently, 
are not interested in the representativity issue.  
 
The questionnaire may be seen as a dragnet. It does not focus on one issue but it has to contain 
various issues, which fascinate various segments of the population in order to get as many 
different respondents as possible. The expectation is that somebody, who likes to give his 
opinion about a specific item, will fill out the whole questionnaire. So there is a module on the 
living situation of the household, on who cares for the children, a module about the job of the 
respondent and that of his or her partner, a module about money spending, about time-spending, 
about the living environment, health and a host of questions inviting respondents to evaluate 
politicians and various aspects of politics.  
The question module on which we are concentrating for this paper is that of the ‘lottery – 
questions’ (Saturday January 17, 1998, q.104). This module runs as follows. 
 
Suppose that a lottery ticket is offered to you for a lottery in which ten people participate (so you have a chance of 1 
in 10 that you will win ). The prize is a money amount equal to your wage per month. What is the maximum amount
1 
you are willing to pay for the ticket? Dfl.….. 
 
Please also answer this question for the following lotteries: 
Five people participate, prize: DFl.1,000      I  pay Dfl……. 
Five people participate, prize: one monthly wage    I  pay Dfl……. 
Ten people participate, prize: Dfl. 5,000      I  pay Dfl……. 
Hundred people participate, prize: Dfl. 1,000    I  pay Dfl……. 
Hundred people participate, prize: Dfl.1 million    I  pay Dfl……. 
                                                           
1 Notice that this is in Dutch guilders as the EURO was introduced afterwards on January 1, 2002. A EURO is about 
one USA $, while a EURO is 2.2 Dutch guilders. 
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The six lotteries differ with respect to the chances π  which equal 1/5, 1/10 and 1/100 and with 
respect to the size of the prize Z . Four prices are in absolute amounts ranging from DFl. 1000 to 
Dfl. 1.000.000. Unlike most lotteries in experimental contexts, where prizes vary between $10.- 
and $200.- the prizes in this case are not small money. The million-guilder prize is particularly 
large and will be equal to between 10 and 15 years income for most respondents. The other two 
prizes vary with the respondent as they are in fact stated in terms of the respondent’s monthly 
wage. As we have an estimate of monthly income for each respondent this is no problem for our 
analysis. It is obvious that this formulation yields a greater variability in the prize range. 
 
3. The Model. 
Let us assume that an individual has a constant monthly net income of y, and that he gets an offer 
to participate in a lottery, which will give a prize Z  with a chance  . Moreover let the price of a 
ticket be denoted by A and his utility function be denoted by U . If individual preferences 
satisfy the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) axioms, then the expected utility of accepting that 




  . (1)  (1 ) ( ) ( ) Uy A Uy A Z ππ −− + − + 
 
The maximum amount an individual is prepared to pay for taking part in the lottery is that 
amount  , which solves the equation   A
  . (2)  (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Uy A Uy A Z Uy ππ −− + − + =
 
We call   the value of the lottery or the reservation price. The problem becomes more complex 
if we assume a multi-period model. We assume that the individual has an income flow   and 
that the price of the ticket has to be paid in the period [
A
() yt
] 0,1  but that the prize, if won, is 
consumed in parts  () p tZ over the period (1  where  , ) ∞
   and 
1
() 1 ptd t
∞
= ∫ ( ) 0 pt ≥  for all t. (3) 
 
  7The time unit is taken to be a month, as some of the prizes are expressed in monthly wage
1. 
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where   stands for the subjective time discount factor. Moreover, we assume in the context of 
buying a lottery ticket that the respondent assumes that his income y and his utility function U  





It follows that the value of A also depends on the way in which the prize is spent over time. If 
we assume that the consumption pattern for the windfall gain can be spent at will, it follows that 
the value of the lottery is found from the equation 
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The answer A that is given by the respondent to the lottery question can thus be seen as the 
respondent’s solution to the above equation (5). As we have six lottery questions we find for 
each respondent n six solutions A  where i . If we want to derive information from 
them with respect to personal parameters with respect to time preference and risk aversion, we 
shall have to make some assumptions, which make our model empirically tractable. 
in 1,...,6 =
  
The value of monthly net household income will be denoted by y or  , if no confusion can 
arise. Moreover we assume that utility functions will be of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
type (CRRA) as introduced by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964). That is, Uy  




(1 ) () / ( 1 ) y γ γ − =−
0 > 1 γ = () l n =
 
 
1 This is an arbitrary assumption. If we take another time unit like two weeks or two months, we do not find very 
different results. For ρ , which depends on the time unit, we have to make a simple correction. We thought that a 
month would conform rather well with the payout time expected by the respondent and with the actual payout time 
of Dutch lotteries. 
  8We may now find the optimum pattern of how the prize Z  should be spent over the future 
periods. Using the continuous formulation (4), the Euler-conditions and the constraints in (3) 
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where we used the definitions of   and ψ  to simplify the expression.   B
As   is monotonically decreasing in t, we find that the spending share would 
eventually become negative. This implies that the time length T  during which the prize is 
spent is finite. We have 
() Bt pt C e ψ =−
max
( ) max 0 =
max
pT . As the shares integrate (or sum) to one, we may solve for 
the two parameters C  and T . As we see from equation (6) the maximum spending time 
 depends on  max T 0
ρ
γ < B  and the ‘relative prize’  ≡− 0 >
y
Z ψ ≡ . In order to get some idea 
of how T varies with the two parameters we present Table 1. We see that T  increases with 
the relative prize. For instance, let us assume an individual with a monthly income of 2000 with  
equal to 2 and a time discount of 2 % (per month). The spending period of a prize of hundred 
times his monthly income, that is 200.000 will then be 115 months, that is, nearly 10 years. 
Notice that for most configurations the spending period will be fairly short. The prize is then 
max max
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 This seems a reasonable hypothesis for most readers, who fill in a large questionnaire on their Saturday evening 
and who do not use sophisticated models on their future income flow. 
  9considered as a windfall profit, to be consumed almost immediately. We also observe that it is 
the ratio of   to   which is important and not the absolute values of those parameters.  γ ρ
 
Table 1: T  for different preferences and different relative prizes.  max
ψ  
  0,01 0,1  1 10  100 
-100 1,09  1,07  1,05  1,03  1,01 
-10 1,69  1,47 1,26 1,11  1,04 
-1 5,66  3,61  2,15  1,42  1,14 
-0,1 27,11  12,46  5,16  2,38  1,44 
B  
-0,01 115,62  42,62  14,82  5,44  2,41 
 
In a discrete-time context we would find a solution ‘between two discrete moments in time’, 
which would imply a rounding-off procedure. It is therefore that we prefer a continuous model. 
Consequently we can evaluate the maximum in equation (5) and solve equation (4) for A given 
 and  , where we assume that the lottery ticket has to be paid uniformly over the first period 
and that the outcome of the (hypothetical) lottery is known and the payment of the prize will be 
realized after one month. More precisely we have 
ρ γ
 
  ( ) ,;,, nnn in i in AA yZ γρ π =   ( ) 1,...,6 i =  (8) 
 




4. The estimates. 
We may consider (8) as a system of six non-linear equations in the two unknowns   and ρ  
where the A  stand for the predicted six responses to the six questions. We notice that Z  and 
 depend on n , since the prizes in lotteries 1 and 3 are formulated in terms of y . It is 




( ) , ˆˆ γρ  for system (8) as we have only two 
unknowns and six equations to be satisfied. Hence we minimized the sum 
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with respect to   and  , where  n γ n ρ ( ) 1 ,....,
n n a ′ =
6 n aa  is the error vector with elements 
( ) lnA l , , , in in n i in y γρ π =− n aA ; n n
u
n
Z in  and A  corresponds to the observed reservation price 
of lottery i for individual n . This yields ‘unweighted average’ values {, , where we 
ignored the rare responses where the ticket prize exceeded the lottery expectation. In those cases 
the average was calculated on less than six responses. We found that responses were moderately 
correlated. Hence we calculated the average covariance matrix. We denote the 6-vector of the 
unweighted ‘residuals’ by a  and we define the average residual covariance-matrix Σ  
1 } uu N
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n n . (10) 
 
The corresponding variance/correlation matrix, where we present the variances on the diagonals 
and the correlation coefficients on the off-diagonal entries, is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The unweighted covariance/correlation matrix of the response residuals 
  1
u a   2
u a   3
u a   4
u a   5
u a   6
u a  
1
u a   . 3 2       
2
u a   -.30  .28     
3
u a   .22  .02  .27    
4
u a   -.07 .03 .24 .24     
5
u a   -.39 -.34 -.63 -.49  .71   
6
u a   -.46 -.00 -.61 -.45  .47  .05 
 
It is seen that the correlation between some residuals is considerable. Therefore we recalculated 
the individual’s   and ρ  by minimizing the weighted sum of residuals   n γ n
 
  , (11)  1 (,) [ ] w
nn n nA n Sa γρ − ′ =Σ u a
  11with respect to ( ) , nn γρ. 
 
In this way we get our revised individual estimates {,  where the superscript indicates 
the weighting. Obviously this is a rather crude method as we estimate the two individual 
parameters   and ρ  from six observations, which are presumably error-ridden and where the 
errors are likely to be correlated. It is obvious that large-sample theory does not apply and hence 
we did not bother to construct standard deviations of the individual parameters. However as our 
number of observations is rather large, N , we may assume that the sample as such 
contains reliable information. 
1 } ww N




The re- weighted residuals a  have a covariance matrix, which appeared practically equal to 
that of the unweighted residuals. First we shall look at some primary statistics. The sample 
averages and standard deviations are given in Table 3 and in Figures 1.a and 1.b we depict the 





Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of  and . 
Variable N average  Stand.dev.  minimum  maximum 
  9420 1.54  3.78  0.01  39.99 
  9420 2.41  1.41  0.01  6.99 
 
 


























  (a) Histogram of  .  (b) Histogram of  .  γ ρ
  12We see that the distribution of   is rather skew and looks, if anything, log- normal. The 
distribution of   is also skew. There is a sizeable part of   estimates that are virtually equal to 
zero. There is also a fat right-tail. The latter class of respondents does not take into account that 
there is no need to consume the lottery prize immediately, but that consumption may be 
smoothed over a longer period of time. As a matter of fact five of the offered lotteries have a 
prize, which will be of the same order of magnitude as a monthly wage. This does not invite to 
serious savings for the future. It follows that it might be that the subjective time discount rate 
used is context-dependent. For major investments we take into account that the harvest may be 
reaped over a long period and that consumption may be gradual over time. For relatively small 
'windfall profits' many individuals will not bother about saving but consume it immediately. For 
those individuals the time discount will be very high. If we normalize the time discount, which 




− t ρ , we can calculate the median value of the distribution for 
 at  . It implies that the median lies at about two weeks. This gives an idea about the 
time horizon, which is used by most respondents in this context. This finding makes it doubtful 
whether individuals use the same time discount in every context. For decisions, which have 
heavy and long-term implications like, for instance, the choice of one's marriage partner, we may 
assume that   will be much smaller. We shall not try to investigate this conjecture within the 
scope of this paper. 




This being said, let us look at the correlation between   and  . We find a moderate negative 
correlation coefficient of − . This indicates firstly that the two concepts are clearly separately 
identifiable, but secondly that high-risk aversion goes hand in hand with low time discounting. 






In this section we shall make an attempt to explain the values found by some independent 
variables. (See for other examples Pålsson (1996), Halek & Eisenhauer (2001), Hartog, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Jonker (2002)). We try to explain   and ln(  by a SUR-model of the type  ln( ) γ ) ρ











As our knowledge about these relationships is almost nil, we shall not attempt to formulate 
sophisticated theories on why we use these linear relationships. We take recourse to the literature 
and to our own intuition. Moreover we are of course dependent on the information in our sample. 
 
First, we introduce (monthly) income y as a variable measured in Dutch guilders. Our idea is that 
risk aversion will decline with increasing income as the same monetary risk becomes relatively 
less important when income increases. For the same reason we may expect that individuals with 
a lot of income will use a higher time discount rate to evaluate the windfall profit of the lottery 
prize. 
 
The second variable is age measured in years. On one hand older people are more settled and 
hence can take more risks. On the other hand older people are more cautious and take less risks. 
With respect to the time discount we observe that with aging the remaining lifetime shortens. 
This would suggest a shrinking time horizon and hence a stronger time discounting. 
 
A third variable is education, measured as the number of years spent on regular education. First, 
we have to realize that education is human capital. It is a powerful instrument to cope with the 
risks of life. Hence, individuals who do not see the risks of life are less interested in education as 
a means to neutralize those risks. Second, individuals with more education have more 
information and hence are more risk-aware. For both reasons we assume that more educated 
people are more risk-averse. Similarly, education is a long-term investment and such a long-term 
investment is triggered by a long time horizon. Hence, we assume that more education goes hand 
in hand with a lower time discount. 
 
Males (a dummy equal to 1) are assumed to be less risk-averse than females (dummy equals 
zero). We do not have any idea about the gender effect on time discounting. 
 
Religion is also a way to cope with the risks of life. Accepting the religious rules gives a feeling 
of safety and security. Hence, individuals with greater risk aversion will tend to be more 
  14religious. Given the orientation on the hereafter in some religions we might expect also an effect 
on time discounting. We included a measure of religiousness, which varies over five categories, 
where 1 stands for non-religious and 5 for very religious. 
 
The essence of the entrepreneur is that he accepts more risks than the ordinary human being. 
Hence, we expect a lower risk aversion for entrepreneurs.  
 
Obvious variables are whether the respondent is working or has no paid activity. If he has not, 
we assume that he is more ‘living by the day’ implying a smaller time horizon, i.e., larger ρ.  
 
For someone living single we assume the same, as his life may be less planned than respondents 
living with a family.  
 
Although we assume that the number of children is related to time discounting, we do not have 
an idea how. It may be that individuals give less weight to the future or that they give more. The 
same holds for children and risk aversion. Clearly, getting children is a risky choice. We would 
expect that families with children are less risk averse. On the other hand, if you like to conform 
to society and you would not like to be lonesome, a good solution is to get children. Such people 
are typically risk averse. 
 
Finally, we know the length and the weight of the respondents, from which we may infer a 
measure of obesity, the so-called Quetelet-index. It is defined as the ratio of the weight in kg, 
divided by the square of the length in meters. This is the generally accepted obesity index. Here 
again it is difficult to predict a relationship between risk aversion and obesity. It is evident that 
eating too much has risky consequences. However, eating too much may also be explained by a 
precautionary motive, because one is afraid to become hungry; that is risk aversion. For the 
relation between obesity and time preference we can think of obesity as a manifestation of 
‘saving in kind’. Then it would follow that individuals with a low time discount rate would 'save' 
much. 
 
  15Now it is time to let the data speak. In Table 4 we present the regression estimates of both 
equations. The observed   and   appear to be negatively correlated with a correlation ratio of 




We see that most coefficients are statistically significant. Indeed age and income have the 
predicted effects. Although we include log-income and its square in the explanation of  ( ) ln ρ  
the top of the parabola is found for an astronomically high income. Hence time preference is 
increasing in y . The difference in risk aversion between males and females is non-significant 
contrary to what is found in the literature. The gender effect on time discounting is very strong. 
Males are much more future looking than females. 
 
Table 4: Regression estimates of  ( ) ln γ  and  ( ) ρ ln  (SUR- regression). 
ln(γ)  Coef.Std. Err. t-stat. ln(ρ)  Coef.Std. Err. t-stat.
         
ln( ) y   -0.052 0.021 -2.560  ln( ) y   1.893 0.393 4.810 
ln( ) Age   -0.228 0.032 -7.040 
2 ln ( ) y   -0.083 0.018 -4.510 
ln( ) Edu   0.189 0.047 3.980  ln( ) Age   0.297 0.047 6.260 
Male -0.038 0.021 -1.790  ln( ) Edu   -0.306 0.059 -5.190 
RELLevel   0.024 0.009 2.720  Male  -0.303 0.026 -11.540 
Entrepeneur   -0.150 0.040 -3.770  Work  -0.136 0.025 -5.370 
ln( ) Q   0.141 0.071 2.000  ln(Q)   -0.206 0.087 -2.370 
Constant 0.358 0.337 1.060 ln(#Child)   0.034 0.019 1.790 
      Single  -0.158 0.028 -5.570 
      Constant -9.613 2.138 -4.500 
8504 N =     2 0.01 R = 8504 N =     2 0.04 R =
 
The effects of religions are as expected. Religious people are more risk averse and more aware of 
the future. Workers appear to have a lower time discount rate than non-actives as we argued 
above, the number of children on the other hand does not have a significant effect on risk 
aversion contrary to what we anticipated.  
 
  16Being single has a very marked influence on the time discount rate, which we did not expect. 
Singles have a wider time horizon than respondents living with a partner or within a household. 
 
Finally, the obesity index has very marked effects both on   and on ρ. Obesity is strongly 
correlated with a higher risk aversion and a smaller time discount. Indeed, eating much may be 
interpreted as ‘saving in kind’. 
γ
 
Although these regression results are significant and interesting we must confess that the R
2 of 
the first equation is   and that of the second equation is  . Hence the explanatory value of 
these models is not overwhelming. However, it is well-known that nearly all estimates, based on 
cross - section micro-data, are plagued by the same phenomenon. Indeed, there must be a lot of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the type of questions that we employ are and cannot be 
very accurately responded. It is stated behavior. The respondent is a Saturday evening-reader of a 
daily, who likes to fill out the rather complex questionnaire, but who can hardly be expected to 
devote much thinking to each separate question. What we register are ‘first sentiments’. The 
advantage is that the respondent does not strive for social desirability, etc. The disadvantage is 
that there will be a considerable amount of white noise in the answers. 
0.01 0.04
 
The correlation between the two errors  γ ε
( )
 and   is estimated to be − . Hence, it seemed 
wise to use the SUR-option. Nevertheless, we feel that the results cannot be discarded as being 
non-significant or intuitively implausible. 
ρ ε .60
 
In the analysis of risk aversion γ  is mostly explained in isolation (from now denoted by γ ), 
that is, without taking into account the time aspect of decisions. Therefore we performed the 
same analysis on the simple model where the individual is expected to behave as if he was 
solving the standard lottery model, given in equation (12) 
s
 
   (12)  () ( 1 ) ( ) Uy A z Uy A Uy ππ −++− − =
 
Some Descriptive statistics are given in Table 5 and the resulting regression equation is given in 
Table 6. 
  17Table 5: Mean and standard deviation of  .  s
Variable N average  Stand.dev.  minimum  Median  maximum 
s γ   9365 41.88 71.29  .005  20.52  1677.79 
 
Table 6: Regression, based on the standard  
Von Neumann-Morgenstern model.  Figure 2: Histogram of Estimated  .  s γ
( ) ln s    Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. 
      
ln( ) y   0.602 0.029 20.980
ln( ) Age   0.587 0.045 12.940
ln( ) Edu   -0.469 0.066 -7.100
Male -0.399 0.030 -13.470
RELLevel 0.051 0.015 3.270
Entrepreneur -0.240 0.069 -3.480
ln(Q)   -0.082 0.099 -0.830
Constant -4.110 0.471 -8.720
8792 N     














We see that nearly all coefficients appear to be highly significant, except the obesity index. 
However, we find coefficients that are completely different from those we found in Table 4 for 
the  -equation. For instance, the negative age effect of −  is reversed to a positive.587. A 
similar change is found for the education effect. In both specifications we find a negative 
entrepreneurial effect. Our conclusion is that the latter specification must be seen as a serious 
misspecification, which yields completely different effects. Of course, we do not try to implicate 
that our two-equation model is the correct specification, but we derive from these results that the 
one-equation model is certainly much worse. 
γ .228
 
Finally, we considered the correlation between the two  ( ) ln γ
0.29
-estimates per individual. We 
found a negative correlation between both estimates of − . The correlation between the two 




  186. Conclusion 
In this paper we looked at various lottery questions that, separately from the risk dimension, have 
a time dimension. That is, the evaluation of the prize does not only depend on the absolute 
amount of the prize but also on the way in which the prize may be gradually spent over time. It is 
intuitively obvious that this plays a greater role for big prizes Z  than for small ones. For 
instance, somebody with an income of $2000,- per month will consider a prize of $10,- as 'small' 
but he will consider a prize of one million dollars as large. For large prizes it is probable that the 
consumption will be smoothed in order to optimize the consumption of the prize over time. In 
our view it is unavoidable to conclude that in general risk aversion cannot be separately 
estimated from lottery questions. So risk aversion should always be estimated jointly with the 
subjective time discount rate except for very small prizes. However, what is ‘small’ depends on 
the personal circumstances of the respondent. 
This finding generalizes to many other settings, where we think of risky assets, portfolios, etc. 
Obviously, this also holds inversely. If we try to estimate subjective time discount rates from the 
evaluation of risky assets over time, we cannot do this without simultaneously taking the attitude 
towards risk into account. 
The second conclusion, which we may draw, is that our subjective time discount estimates are 
very high, at least compared to what is generally assumed in the literature. Although it is now 
recognized that the subjective time discount rate and the market interest rate are two different 
things and that the subjective concept is much higher, the average we find would imply a time 
half - value of about two weeks which is obviously a very short time horizon. Our explanation is 
that the time discount rate is case - and context - dependent. First, if the decision to be taken or 
the choice to be made has no long-term consequences, individuals will reduce their time horizon. 
For instance, if the prize is so small, that it will be consumed with certainty in one year from 
now, the individual will not bother with the period farther away and truncate the time weight 
distribution. The time discount distribution utilized is case-dependent. The weighting system, 
which is used, is not the true time discount distribution but a truncated version of it. We surmise 
that the horizon is shorter as the ratio (Z ) is smaller.  /y
 
  19Next to that there is presumably a context - dependence. If the individual has to make a serious 
decision this requires an effort of the mind. One such an effort is to realize what your time 
preference distribution is (approximately), because you are not daily thinking of it. It is a second 
effort to look for an optimal spending program. Hence, if we look at hypothetical survey 
questions where nothing really is at stake, we may not suppose that respondents make a very 
serious effort in answering the question. And again, a truncation of the time horizon is an 
efficient way to reduce the response effort.  
Hence, we assume that the same method will yield more plausible results for the time discount 
rate if we propose lotteries, which require a wider time horizon. This may be generated by, 
formulating prizes, which are not an incidental windfall profit, but which affect the individuals 
income flow over lifetime. For instance a doubling of income over the remaining lifetime. (see 
Barsky et al.). 
Summarizing, we believe that this is a fruitful approach, but that it can still be improved in a 
number of directions. 
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